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, 
what counts as wise? Second, does 
the public, after considerable thought, 
think that our society has a moral 
obligation to pursue lines of research 
which may benefit present and future 
generations? I say “moral obligation” 
because it is sometimes implied by 
advocates of recombinant D N A  re- 
search that science would be guilty 
of a sin of omission if it did not con- 
tinue and promote research so pro- 
mising in theoretical and practical 
benefits. I would prefer to say that the 
research is desirable and valuable, but 
by no means is it! morally obligatory. 
It is just one choice among many we 
can make in allocating our  scientific 
resources. But I would like to know 
what the public-after due considera- 
tion-thinks about all that. Third, 
what does the public think about risks 
and benefits? How, in some rational 
way, ought the public to think about 
that problem? 
One obvious implication of this line 
of thinking is that the public has as 
much obligation to act responsibly as 
does the scientific community. The  
calls for socially responsible scientists 
could well be matched with some 
concern about a socially responsible 
public. The future of the recombinant 
D N A  debate will depend on the qual- 
ity of the dialogue between the scien- 
tific community and the public. Nei- 
ther side can conduct the debate on 
its own. The public must be kept in- 
formed in the future, must have a 
central role in present policy formation, 
and must develop standards by which 
to judge the issues. Scientists must 
bring their knowledge, and just as 
important, their lack of knowledge 
out into the open, not just once but 
again and again. 
The public and the scientific com- 
munity have now begun to talk. This 
marriage can be saved. 
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Who Decides Who Decides? 
I t  is a basic belief of most uni- 
versity faculty members and, indeed, 
of educated people everywhere in the 
West that freedom of inquiry must 
not be constrained in any arbitrary 
manner, especially not by persons out- 
side the community of peers associ- 
ated with the inquiry. It is, however, 
an increasingly challenged belief. 
If the university were to forfeit, 
through citizen involvement, its ex- 
clusive right (within N I H  regulations) 
to  determine whether recombinant 
D N A  research should be undertaken, 
it would very likely be establishing a 
precedent not only with regard to free- 
dom of inquiry in this area but in any 
othei  area of the natural or social 
sciences where members of the com- 
munity could argue that they were be- 
ing put a t  physical or emotional risk 
by the research process itself or its 
possible products. Given changes in 
attitudes toward science, participation, 
and decision making, such a prece- 
dent would profoundly disrupt the 
elaborate and subtle mechanisms that 
motivate and guide science and sys- 
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tematic inquiry in general. Conse- 
quences would be as unpredictable 
and possibly as societally catastrophic 
as those feared from the D N A  re- 
search itself. However, some would 
argue (myself included) that the very 
fact of growing challenges to the 
ethic of freedom of inquiry and to its 
maintenance through “duly consti- 
tuted authority,” make it all the more 
necessary to discover new ways of 
reconciling the demands for participa- 
tion by those putatively a t  risk with 
demands for protection of inquiry. 
It is going to  take time and much 
experience to learn what values and 
techniques work and the hour is al- 
ready late. 
The  first question we could ask is: 
“What is the appropriate geographic 
and temporal scale from which to 
draw the decision makers?” With chi- 
meric biological materials it is im- 
possible to  anticipate how widespread 
will be the consequences for natural 
life forms. Therefore the appropriate 
decision-maker pool would seem to in- 
clude the whole world as well as future 
generations since everyone, especially 
future generations, may be the deliber- 
ate or inadvertent beneficiaries or 
casualties of this research. But there 
is no such decision-making capability 
on  the world level; the initial examina- 
tion of the risks in recombinant D N A  
research, undertaken by involved sci- 
entists during a self-imposed mora- 
torium, is as close to world-scale par- 
ticipation as we’ve come. 
We are thus thrown back on the 
nation as more appropriate than the 
immediate environs around the re- 
search laboratory for making decisions 
that have such profound consequences 
over space and time. The  N I H  guide- 
line deliberations were an exceptional 
and on the whole admirable experi- 
ment in this direction though these 
lacked sophisticated studies delineating 
the long-term social costs and bene- 
fits of the research, in part because 
we know too little. Moreover, the 
question of who would be entitled to  
participate in decisions about risks in 
the proximate area of the research 
was left unexamined. But the funda- 
mental flaw in the NIH approach was 
that it reinforced the usual mode of 
operation-geographically separate in- 
stitutions compete for funds and for 
the prestige won through successful 
research. This mode inevitably puts a 
premium on getting there “first with 
the most,” and it focuses concern at 
the local level over whether to  incur 
the associated risks. 
Making decisions in areas of chang- 
ing values, risks, and ambiguities re- 
quire profound, perhaps radical, 
changes in the norms by which deci- 
sion-making entities in research-ori- 
ented organizations operate. 
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